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In the last fifteen years Cuban economy has been in crisis. Social tells ions
have been rising. The health condition of Fidel Castro shows some signs
of deterioration. What is the real strength of Cuba s internal oppOSi~iOll?
Will succession and transition after the President Castro develop III a
peaceful atmosphere or not? Are there prospects for a peaceful succession
and democratic transition?
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1. Introduction
In the last few years, as the health condition of
Cuba's President comandante enjefe Fidel Castro be-
gan to show signs of an inevitable deterioration, inter-
national attention has been focused on possible sce-
narios of the succession and on perspectives for a demo-
cratic transition. Some important questions emerge. Will
succession of power take the course devised by Fidel
Castro? Will the succession be accompanied by a po-
litical transition or will it be only later followed by a
transition towards democracy? What is the real strength
of the intemal opposition and their strategy? Will suc-
cession and transition develop in a peaceful atmosphere
or would they be marred by violence? How the Cuban
community in Miami will react? What will be the policy
of the United States and of some other relatively im-
portant players, the countries with large economic in-
terests in today's Cuba, such as Canada or Spain? What
importance has the growing number of democratic left
and radical leftist govemments in Latin America for
the transition in Cuba?
. Vojko Senker, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of
Croatia, Athens.
The views expressed herein are the personal views of the au-
thor and are not intended to reflect the views of the Ministry of
foreign affairs.
It is difficult to answer those questions since
we do not know the conditions at the time of Presi-
dent Castro's demise and after that. However, it is
certain that the development of the political situa-
tion in Cuba after F. Castro will primarily depend on
the intemal factors (such as the strength and unity of
the political elite and their capacity to survive and to
control the situation), on the economic situation, in-
temal opposition groups and organizations, and rc-
actions of the people. In addition to internal factors,
the course of events in post-Castro Cuba will be sig-
nificantly influenced by the policy of the United
States in the critical moments of succession, and on
the way Cuban immigrants in the US will act.
2. Internal political, social
and economic situation in
today's Cuba
In the last fifteen years Cuban economy has
been in crisis and social tensions have been rising,
as a direct consequence of the fall of the Soviet bloc,
because the conditions that enabled the Cuban po-
litical and economic system to function rather
smoothly for decades changed drastically, and the
ruling elite was not prepared to introduce bold re-
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forms to adapt to the changed environment. Together
with the worsening of the economic and social situ-
ation, repression was tightened in the beginning of
the 2151 century, for the first time after the 1970s.
After the integration into the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Cuba was fo-
cusing on increasing the production of sugar in ex-
change for Soviet oil. The bulk of raw sugar was
exported to the USSR, which paid prices several
times higher than those prevailing on the world mar-
kct, and almost 100% of Cuba's needs for crude oil
were satisfied by importing cheap oil from the USSR.
In addition, the USSR regularly granted credits to
Cuba under favorable conditions. The Soviet assist-
ance contributed up to 21% to Cuba's GDP. As the
direct benefit of these subsidies Cuban GDP growth
was quite stable, so that considerable achievements
were accomplished in education, health, social se-
curity, employment and distribution. On the other
hand, the increasing production of sugar distorted
Cuba's economic development and limited the na-
tional economy's ability to produce other goods and
services.
From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s some
modest market reforms were implemented such as
opening of farmers and crafts free markets, wage
incentives, productivity increase, or foreign invest-
ments. Those reforms were soon abandoned, because
Fidel Castro has always been strongly against any
form of "market socialism", so that short periods of
inevitable reforms were always followed by ideo-
logical campaigns of "rectification".
After the collapse of the USSR, Cuba's GDP
fell 33% between 1989 and 19931• A "Special Pe-
riod" (Periodo especial) was proclaimed. The crisis
reached its peak in 1993, with almost all social indi-
cators worsened. For example, 31% of the capital
Havana's population was considered poor in 2002.2
The system of health care deteriorated, employment
shrunk and subsidized monthly food rations were
reduced.
In order to halt the further decline of the
economy and prevent social unrest, President Castro
was again forced to implement some economic re-
forms (1993-1996) which included promoting for-
eign investments, very limited forms of private ini-
tiative, encouraging remittances from Cuban com-
munity abroad by legalizing the circulation of US
dollar C'dolarizacion"), development of tourism, re-
vival of agriculture and reforms of state corporations.
Some results were encouraging. Emigrants' remit-
tances reached 1.3 billion US$ in 2003. Foreign in-
vestments in the period 1991-2002 totaled 2 billion
US$, especially in tourism, basic industry (nickel,
oil explorations) and construction. Most investments
came from Canada and Europe (Spain). Around 1.8
million of foreign tourists visited Cuba in 2001.
Unfortunately, the reforms, particularly those
related with the private initiative were slowed in 1996
and stopped in 2003. Today, a re-centralization of
the state sector is obvious, as well as the reduction
of the small and weak private sector: from 200,000
in 1997, the number of micro-enterprises dropped to
150,000 in 200P
After 2001 a drop in tourist industry in the
world (after S-11) affected Cuba too. New period of
stagnation of the Cuban economy became visible as
of2003. The sugar cane harvest in 2003 was the worst
in 70 years. Around 70 sugar mills were closed and
200,000 workers lost their jobs, although remaining
on the state payroll. The living standards of Cuban
population still have not reached those of 1989.
In spite of this negative development, Castro
continued his opposition to any significant economic
reforms, in his pursuit of a "moral" socialist economy.
"Evidently, within the current political system, it is
impossible to foresee a radical transformation capa-
ble of putting the Cuban economy on the path of sus-
tainable growth."?
The political situation in Cuba during the last
several years, as compared to the 1980s, is charac-
terized by an increased repression aimed both at dis-
couraging attempts of popular unrest or massive un-
controlled emigration, as well as at intimidating in-
temal opposition.
There were two major uncontrolled emigra-
tion incidents in Cuba in the last ten years that could
have evolved into a popular unrest. In July 1994 a
group of Cubans sequestrated a ship in order to im-
migrate to Florida. Cuban security forces intercepted
and sunk it (41 persons died). In early August thou-
sands of people gathered in the Havana port waiting
for announced embarkations that would transport
them to the US Since the ships did not appear, anti-
govemment demonstrations began, but the regime
did not react violently. Instead, temporary free emi-
gration was permitted and 35,000 people left Cuba
on improvised rafts. In September an agreement was
reached between Cuba and the US, introducing an
annual quota of up to 20,000 Cuban emigrants. In
spring of 2003 another wave of attempts of Cubans
-------~
JULY - DECEMBER 2005 135
to leave their country in rafts or sequestrated ships
and aircraft occurred. This time the reaction of the
government was drastic: three Cuban citizens that
sequestrated a ferry in Havana were arrested, sen-
tenced to death and fusilladed.
During the late 1990s the regime seemed to
tolerate the obvious strengthening of the dissent and
some sort of an independent civil society. During the
Iberoamerican Summit in 1999 in Havana several
dissident leaders were even permitted to meet for-
eign political leaders. Such policy of Cuban govern-
ment led to a temporary improvement of the rela-
tions with the United States (with the Clinton Ad-
ministration), in spite of the Helms-Burton Law be-
ing adopted by the Congress in 1966, and with the
European Union. However, at the same time, the Law
on Protection of National Independence and
Economy of Cuba was enacted in 1999, prescribing
severe sentences for the expression of opinions "con-
trary to national interests and sovereignty of Cuba",
preparing grounds for a decisive blow against the
opposition. During that period some political oppo-
sition organizations were formed. President Bush's
Administration started supporting them. The most
dangerous challenge to the regime appeared to be
"The Varela Project" (EI proyecto Varela), led by
Oswaldo Paya, because the varelistas opted for po-
litical and legislative initiatives within the existing
political system. In the beginning of 2002 they pre-
pared an initiative for a constitutional change (full
guarantees of the freedom of expression and asso-
ciation, amnesty for political prisoners, right to es-
tablishment of private enterprises and new electoral
law). Using the possibility offered by Cuban Consti-
tution, they gathered more than 11,000 signatures of
Cuban citizens on a document proposing a referen-
dum on constitutional changes and presented it to
the National Assembly in the beginning of May. Few
days later former President Carter visited Havana in
an attempt to promote an improvement of the Ameri-
can-Cuban relations and to re-affirm the values of
democracy. In his speech at Havana University, trans-
mitted live by the Cuban TV, he appraised the "Varela
Project's" recent initiatives.
The government's reaction followed. In June
2002 the government launched a huge popular mo-
bilization, with massive manifestations supporting
constitutional changes, but not those proposed by the
Varela Project. The proposal of the Government was
to add an amendment to the Constitution forbidding
the National Assembly to enact any law that would
challenge socialism. A campaign of signing the
"popular initiative" in favor of the amendment was
organized and as a result 98.97% of the registered
voters signed the petition. By the end of June 2002
the Parliament adopted the constitutional amendment
on the "irrevocability of socialism". Castro's inten-
tion was clear: to show that while the opposition can
mobilize thousands, he still can mobilize millions of
Cubans.
In the next few weeks the preparations for the
Sixth Communist Party Congress (planned for the
end of 2002) were halted. It was widely expected
that the Congress would re-affirm the economic re-
forms carried on from 1991 to 1996 and introduce
some political changes (creation of the position of
prime minister, eventual change ofthe Party's name,
etc). Some reformists, such as former foreign minis-
ter Roberto Robaina and former ideological secre-
tary of the Party Carlos Aldana were expelled from
the Party. The ideological campaigns, permanent
mobilizations of the population and media propa-
ganda were launched instead of necessary economic
and political reforms. The campaigns and ideologi-
cal "purification" of the Communist Party continue.
Since the activity of the opposition continued,
especially of the varelistas, openly backed by the
Bush Administration. which put the strengthening
of internal Cuban opposition in the focus of its policy
towards Cuba, Castro reacted with an unprecedented
repression: 75 dissidents, human-rights activists, in-
dependent writers and journalists were arrested in
March 2003 and sentenced to long imprisonment.
They were accused of conspiring against the inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the nation, al-
though all their actions were public and consisted of
writing their ideas, defending human rights, and pro-
moting the Varela Project.' In April and May another
16 dissidents were convicted. During 2004 fourteen
of the imprisoned dissidents were released.
The executions and arrests in 2003 as well as
intensifying of an anti-American campaign were clear
message to all Cubans, to the "reformers" within the
Party, to the opposition and to the US that Fidel
Castro has no intention to permit any changes that
would threaten the succession of power. The leader-
ship wanted to show that the Revolution is still alive
and strong and that they would do everything to en-
sure that post-Castro succession takes place only
within the existing system and not outside it. The
timing of this wave of repression coincided with the
beginning of the crisis in Iraq, and Castro possibly
calculated that international reactions to the events
in Cuba will be weak. But, the immediate conse-
quences of the executions and arrests were the in-
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tensification of the US administration's preparations
for the future non-communist post-Castro Cuba. the
tightening of the US embargo and worsening of the
relations with the E.U.
3. Key Players in Cuba's
Future Succession
There is no doubt that the key internal factors
which will inf1uence the take-over of political power
after Castro are the institutions of existing political
system and the ruling elite around them, the Cuban
people and the internal opposition, while the most
important external players will be the United States
and exiled Cubans in Miami. European Union,
Canada and Latin America will also playa signifi-
cant role.
The most important institutions of the con-
temporary Cuba are the armed forces and the Com-
munist Party. According to a majority of analysts,
the strongest institutions of Castro's regime are the
armed forces (FAR Fue rz as armadas
revolucionariasy. "A Castro creation, they have de-
veloped a large measure of professionalism, are thor-
oughly integrated into the political system, and en-
joy an important role in the general management and
control of the economy. Today, more than 65 per-
cent of major industries and enterprises are in the
hands of current or former military officers." The
Ministry of I.nterior and the whole security appara-
tus is under the absolute control of the military.
Within the Communist Party (PCC), the re-
formist officials were neutralized, as the preparations
for the Sixth Congress were halted, and the oppo-
nents of the reforms promoted. Sinee 2003 signifi-
cant personal changes at provincial level have been
carried on, bringing younger leaders absolutely loyal
to Castro to the key positions in the wake of succes-
sion.
The central organs of political power in Cuba
are the Politburo of the Communist Party (24 mem-
bers), the Council of State (31 members) and the
Council of Ministers (38 members). Their strueture
is overlapping. The most powerful persons, who are
members of all of the three organs are: Fidel Castro,
Raul Castro, Carlos Lage (secretary of the Couneil
of Ministers and vice president of the Council of
State, de facto prime minister), General Abelardo
Colome (minister of the interior), General Pedro
Miret and Jose Balaguer (minister of health). Other
influential officials are Ricardo Alarcon, president
of the National Assembly and Felipe Perez, minister
of foreign affairs. Fidel Castro (79) is the first secre-
tary of the Communist Party and president of the
Council of State (head of state) and the Council of
Ministers (prime minister). His younger brother Gen-
eral Raul Castro (74) is the minister of defense, sec-
ond secretary of the Party and first vice-president of
the Council of State and Council of Ministers, des-
ignated by President Fidel Castro as his immediate
successor.
As a result of recent economic reforms a new
entrepreneurial class has emerged, working as man-
agers in state corporations and joint-venture compa-
nies. Many of them came from the military ranks.
They arc situated out of the ruling political class,
but closely linked to it. 7
Within the context of the overall worsening
of the economic and social situation, increasing signs
of social inequalities within Cuban people are
present. First of all, the ruling political, military and
entrepreneurial elite traditionally live in better con-
ditions than the vast majority of the population. Sec-
ondly, recent economic reforms, albeit limited, cre-
ated a sharp polarization between those who receive
dollar remittances and those who do not have dol-
lars. People who have no other means to survive of-
ten engage in all kinds of illegal activities (black
market, corruption). There are also other significant
social problems in contemporary Cuba such as an
alienated youth, or growing racial frictions.
As it usually happens in all revolutionary re-
gimes that become totalitarian, in Cuba the initial
enthusiasm and support of the youth began to van-
ish. This process started in the late 1970s when ex-
iled Cubans were permitted to visit the country and
young Cubans saw the possibilities ofa different life.
It continued in the 1980s when Cuban young gen-
eration received Gorbatchev's glasnost and
perestroika with interest, while Castro strongly op-
posed them. Naturally, with the worsening of the
economic situation after 1989 the youth became even
more alienated, and mostly are "disaffected and dis-
connected from politics"," facing austerity, repres-
sion and unemployment.
Blacks and mulattos make up more than 50%
of Cuba's population. Their proportion rose due to
interracial marriages and emigration of a million and
half mostly white Cubans. After 1959 the new revo-
lutionary government strongly promoted racial equal-
ity, outlawing all forms of discrimination and im-
proving the economic position of the poor (high per-
centage of the poor were Afro-Cubans). When a good
___ L
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part of Cuban middle class (almost entirely white)
left Cuba. employment and housing opportunities
were opened for blacks and mulattos. So. they be-
came the most enthusiastic supporters of the revolu-
tion.? But some racial inequalities have persisted.
Blacks and mulattos still live in the poorest areas.
The percentage of Afro-Cubans in the ruling elite is
still low. After 1989, blacks and mulattos became
poorer because they receive fewer dollar remittances
from abroad.
It is difficult to assess the degree of support
for the regime among Cuban population, since there
arc no opinion polls. Although the revolution did not
fulfill the promise to establish full political liberties
and democracy after the fall of Batista dictatorship,
some of its achievements were received with full
support within the majority of the Cuban population:
the defense of national sovereignty and dignity in
the relations with the US, social justice for the poor
and marginalized, free education for all, advanced
health services and full employment. It is possible
that the increasing repression, social inequalities, and
poverty have increased the popular discontent and
shrunk the popularity of the revolution.
The internal opposition has strengthened in
the recent 10-15 years with growing intemational
support. According to A. J Hidalgo, a former Cuban
diplomat and journalist, almost 300 opposition or-
ganizations existed in Cuba in the moment of the
repressive crackdown in April 2003, majority of them
very small.'? They began a process of integration
t,owards three main streams: the Assembly for the
Promotion of the Civil Society, the Progressive Arch
and the Christian Liberation Movement, which in-
cludes also the Varela Project. In spite of the repres-
sion, they continue their activities. Oswaldo Paya,
the initiator of the Varela Project, in December 2002
informally released his "Transitional Program",
where he outlined his ideas on the transition in Cuba,
and in 2004 he launched a document "National Dia-
logue", which ealls for a national political debate.
The main problems of the opposition are the frag-
mentation and their relation with the exiled Cubans'
political organizations, as well as the intimidations
and harassment of the state security, which have de-
stroyed or discredited several opposition groups. The
reaction of the govemment in 2003 demonstrates that
their strength became intolerable for the regime, al-
though they still do not represent a serious threat.
The United States has imposed economic
sanctions and travel restrictions and severed diplo-
matic relations with Cuba soon after the victory of
Fidel Castro's revolution. The nine presidential ad-
ministrations in the US since 1959, both Democratic
and Republican, have been consistent in their strat-
egy toward Fidel Castro and have had the only ob-
jective: to create economic collapse and provoke the
fall of the regime, abstaining from any form of the
military intervention. This is probably the longest
trade embargo in the modern history.
The Helms-Burton Law (1996) and the Com-
mission for Assistance to a Free Cuba's Report
(2004) represent a road map of the US policy to-
ward Cuba. The Helms-Burton Law tightens the eco-
nomic embargo and establishes the conditions for
the normalization of relations with Cuba. Among the
main conditions are the settlement of the claims for
the confiscated property, and the free elections in
Cuba. The Law also imposes sanctions against for-
eign enterprises that have business with Cuba under
certain conditions.
On 10 October 2003, President George W.
Bush announced the creation of a C0l11111issiOIlfor
Assistance to a Free Cuba. with a mandate to report
to the President with recommendations on develop-
ing a comprehensive program to:
1. "Bring about a peaceful, near-term end to the
dictatorship;
2. Establish democratic institutions, respect for
human rights, and the rule of law;
3. Create the core institutions of a free economy;
4. Modernize infrastructure; and
5. Meet basic needs in the areas of health, edu-
cation, housing and human services"."
Commission members are top representatives
of the Government agencies. In addition, an office
of "Cuba Transition Coordinator" has been estab-
lished in the Department of State and Caleb McCarry
named Coordinator in July 2005.
The Commission's Report was presented to
President Bush on May 6, 2004. Chapter 1 of the
Report identifies means by which the US can "help
the Cuban people bring about an end to the Castro
dictatorship.t"? The strategy is multidimensional:
adopting measures to empower Cuban civil society;
breaking the regime's information blockade of the
Cuban people; reducing financial flows to the regime;
undermining the regime's "succession strategy" (i.e.
from Fidel to Raul Castro) by increasing pressures
on the ruling elite and its principal instruments of
coercion/control; aggressively increasing public di-
plomacy efforts abroad to counter Cuban propa-
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ganda; and encouraging multilateral efforts to chal-
lenge the Cuban regime. J3
Chapters 2 to 6 represent a detailed survey of
the areas in which the US Government can assist a
free Cuba in all facets of its reconstruction and re-
newal.!' According to some analysts, the Report "is
a detailed program for the transition that, however,
reflects low knowledge of the real Cuba - it says,
for example, that all children, younger than 5 should
be vaccinated - and involves the US in almost all the
affairs that are fundamentally within the competence
of the Cubans on the island, although always stating
that the American assistance will be offered only if
requested by a democratic Cuban government". 15
The Commission had another meeting under
the chairmanship of the Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice on December 19,2005. Secretary
Rice stated that by implementing recommendations
in the Commission first report, "we have empow-
cred Cuban civil society to better organize and ad-
vocate for democratic change; we have established
measures that denied millions of dollars in revenue
to the dictatorship; we are breaking the regime's in-
formation blockade on the Cuban people; and we
have drawn greater attention the dictatorship's de-
plorable treatment of the Cuban people"." Some of
the recommendations from the Report have already
been implemented. For example, the visits of the
exiled Cubans to their families on the island have
been limited (one visit every 3 years) and the amount
of money they can take from the US reduced. Send-
ing of remittances has also been limited (one remit-
tance every 3 months). It is highly doubtful whether
these measures, as well as the whole concept of the
embargo, affect only the regime, and not the people
of Cuba. They also offer to Castro's propaganda a
justification for the difficult economic and social situ-
ation and for the repression against the dissidents.
Totalitarian regimes always need "foreign enemies".
A second report oftbe Commission is expected
to be handed to the President in May 2006, with "both
updated recommendations to hasten democracy, and
an inter-agency strategic plan to assist a Cuban-led
transition" .17
The policy of the Bush administration, the
most severe since the 1960s, does not accept any
notion of a succession and is seeking a most rapid
political transition. The following statement of the
chief of the US Interest section in Havana demon-
strates this position clearly. "Achieving such a total,
durable transition to democracy and free market
economy remains the unwavering policy of the
United States ...Mere 'stability' would not be an ac-
ceptable outcome; nor would any other outcome that
fails to provide immediate, genuine freedom to the
Cuban people.':" So, the motto of the US policy could
be resumed in the following phrase: succession - no,
transition - yes, while Castro's strategy is: succes-
sion - )'es, transition - no.
The Cuban community in the US is large and
int1uential, located mainly in Florida. In the begin-
ning, since there was no internal opposition in Cuba,
the exiled Cubans were the only opponents of Castro
and many of them thought that only they, assisted by
the US, could bring the change of the regime on the
island, even by force if necessary. They approved
the embargo and advocated the use of the US mili-
tary force against Castro's regime.
Today, the Cuban community in Miami has
been "in transition". Thousands of new immigrants
that arrived from Cuba in the last 20 years have
changed the exile. They are in favor of the US dia-
logue with Cuba and support the emigrants' visits to
the island. Today, more than 30% of Cubans in the
US are against embargo. The vast majority is now
against the use of force and terrorism. Around 77%
think that the democratization of Cuba is the sole
responsibility of the Cubans and not of the US Some
55 percent support a national dialogue among the
Cuban government, the internal opposition and the
exile. The majority of them now recognize the lead-
ing role of the internal opposition in Cuba and sev-
eral exiled Cubans' political organizations are in
close contacts with the dissent on the island and
gradually accept the idea of a peaceful transition.
Cuba is the only country in the region that still
does not have a cooperation agreement with the EU.
The legal basis for the EU relations with Cuba is
the Common Position, as approved by the Council
of Ministers in 1996. According to the Common
Position "the objective of the European Union in its
relations with Cuba is to encourage s process oftran-
sition to a pluralist democracy and respect for hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as
sustainable recovery and improvement in the living
standards of the Cuban people'?". On the basis of
the Common Position and in order to facilitate peace-
ful change in Cuba, the Commission and the Mem-
ber States may provide assistance to Cuba. Cuba re-
jects the Common Position as interference in its in-
ternal affairs.
The issue of human rights has been the main
reason of tensions in the relations between Cuba and
the EU. The EU member states, represented in the
UN Human Rights Commission regularly vote in
favor of the resolutions on human rights in Cuba.
After the arrest and trial of 75 dissidents in March
2003, the EU imposed diplomatic sanctions on Cuba
on 5 June 2003 with the following measures: limit
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high level government visits; reduce the profile of
member states' participation in cultural events; in-
vite Cuban dissidents to national day celebrations
and proceed to an earlier re-evaluation of the Com-
mon Position. In response, Cuba announced on 26
July 2003 their refusal of all direct aid coming from
the EU. Cuban government severed all official rela-
tions with the EU member countries' embassies in
Havana.
As 14 dissidents were released during 2004,
on 31 January 2005, the Council suspended tempo-
rarily all the measures imposed on 5 June 2003, and
the suspension was confirmed in June 2005. The
Council stated the willingness to maintain a construc-
tive dialogue with Cuba, but also it decided to inten-
sify contacts with the political opposition and civil
society in Cuba. High political officials visiting Cuba
should raise the issue of human rights in their talks
with the Government and the civil society. In re-
sponse, Cuban Govenunent resumed formal relations
with the EU member countries' ambassadors in Ha-
vana. Some EU member states, in particular former
communist countries (Poland, Czech Republic, and
Slovakia) are not very happy about resuming rela-
tions with Havana. Several other countries have con-
siderable economic interests in Cuba and it influ-
ences their positions.
Canada's policy towards Cuba is based on
similar principles as the one of the EU. Some Cana-
dian companies are among the biggest foreign in-
vestors in Cuba, especially in mining and oil explo-
rations. Canadian companies built the new Havana
airport few years ago.
Cuba's relations with the countries of Latin
America have been normalized and continue to im-
prove, although at a relatively low profile. The ma-
jority of the Latin American countries consider that
Cuba, belonging to the region, should not be iso-
lated, although they do not approve Cuban human
rights policy, which is demonstrated in their voting
in the UN Commission on Human Rights (some
countries abstain, while others vote in favor of the
resolution).
Cuba and Venezuela have developed close re-
lations and a common anti-US front. Castro and
Chavez share similar political and ideological ideas.
The two countries' bilateral trade reached 1.2 bil-
lion US$ in 2005. Venezuela exports 90,000 barrels
of oil daily to Cuba with favorable terms (a part is
paid in services or on credit, with preferential prices).
In return, Cuba sends thousands of doctors and other
technical cooperation experts to work in social
projects in Venezuela. Castro's relations with new
Bolivian President Morales are also very good.
4. Cuba after Fidel Castro:
Succession or Transition?
It is impossible to predict the course of events
in Cuba after the demise of President Fidel Castro,
since nobody knows when the succession will oc-
cur, who will take over and in what internal and ex-
ternal environment the changes will take place. The
majority of analysts think that the immediate suc-
cession will take place within the institutions of the
present political system, or in other words, that Cuba
"will remain for some time under some kind of au-
thoritarian control"." Some of them expect very lim-
ited reforms, while others think that Cuba will fol-
low the Chinese or Vietnamese model, rather than
that of North Korea. There are also some opinions
that there will be no communist succession govern-
ment (or a very short period of the communist suc-
cession), and that after Fidel Castro a democratic
transitional government will take over.
The most likely scenario is that General Raul
Castro will succeed Fidel Castro, of course if his
physical conditions permit him to be politically ac-
tive at the moment of the succession. In that case, he
would be the first secretary of the Cuban Commu-
nist Party and the supreme commander of the armed
forces. Whether the Council of State will continue
to exist with Raul as its president, or the function of
the President of the Republic will be introduced, re-
mains to be seen. It is almost certain that the posi-
tion of the prime minister will be created, as it was
mentioned during the Fourth Communist Party Con-
gress, with one of the civilian members of the ruling
elite elected to this office (Carlos Lage, Ricardo
Alarcon, Marcos Portal or Felipe Perez Roque could
be possible candidates). The possibility of a civilian
president of Cuba also cannot be excluded, in which
case Raul Castro would retain the control of key in-
stitutions - the armed forces and the Communist
Party. Raul Castro has no charisma and legitimacy
of Fidel Castro (who became the undisputed leader
of Cuba after the victory of the revolution), although
he has strong institutional influence, developed dur-
ing his service as his brother's deputy during several
decades. Thus he would probably create some sort
of a collective leadership, to maintain unity among
the ruling elite. According to some writers, Raul
Castro is more practical, focused and pragmatic that
Fidel. He is able to permit different opinions and to
discuss solutions with his collaborators.
Raul Castro, as an eventual successor, should
create an image of internal and international cred-
ibility. To achieve the internal legitimacy, he would
need the support of the military, party leaders and
technocrats within the government, as well as to ini-
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tiate economic and social reforms that would satisfy
the population. To get the international credibility,
the successor government should not be entirely
military and this is why civilians should have to get
some top positions. Thus, though it is highly prob-
able that during the succession period the Cuban
armed forces will have the most important role, as
"guardians of the Revolution", a possibility of an
entirely military government after President Fidel
Castro departure, similar to General Jaruzelsky's
government in Poland (1981 to 1989), mentioned by
some analysts," is unlikely, except in a situation of
an internal political crisis in Cuba in the moments of
the succession or if a foreign intervention occurs.
The succession government in Cuba will face
very delicate challenges: difficult economic situa-
tion, social problems, popular dissent and growing
internal opposition, as well as the hostile policy of
the United States.
If the succession takes place within the exist-
ing political system, with Raul Castro as the leader,
or with collective leadership without him, the gov-
ernment will have to introduce economic reforms.
Raul Castro seems to be in favor of them. During the
Fourth Communist Party Congress in 1992, Raul
Castro said that he was worried "what will happen if
we don't make much-needed changes now, and if
we don't make them under Fidel.?" Since there is
no chance, even a theoretical one, that Raul Castro
and the rest of the succession leaders would permit
reforms that go beyond the existing system under
the rule of the Communist Party, it is likely that they
would follow the examples of China and Vietnam.
While Fidel Castro publicly praised the reforms in
these countries, but refused to apply the concept of
"market socialism" in Cuba, Raul Castro is said to
be interested in reforms of Chinese and Vietnamese
style. Such reforms would promote significant
changes in the economic sector, maintaining the au-
thoritarian character of the regime and the undisputed
role of the Communist Party. Vietnam and China
permitted the private initiative, attracted foreign in-
vestments, developed an export-oriented economy
and liberalized trade, accomplishing increased and
sustained GDP growth. "All of these endeavors have
been carried out in a calculated method allowing
growth, but not at the expense of the majority of the
population, as was the case in other countries that
hastily embraced reforrns.''" Whether the reforms
in Cuba will be bold, or gradual and limited, remains
to be seen.
The succession government would have to
cope with social problems and popular dissent. If
they introduce economic reforms, the population
would approve them, if they promise to change their
social problems immediately. If not, people would
not have much patience. Also, it is difficult to ex-
pect that people would show much understanding
for any new sacrifices, waiting for the result of some
painful reforms. The reforms should be carefully
designed, so that they do not aggravate already ex-
isting social polarization. Racial problems should be
carefully handled. Eventual mass jobs curtailing,
which is inevitable in all economic reforms, could
provoke social explosion with political conse-
quences. That is why such measures should be cou-
pled with self-employment and some degree of pri-
vate initiative. Also, direct foreign investments
should be promoted and effectively protected. If the
government loosens the emigration controls, there
is a danger of a massive emigration wave. From the
other side, even if the government permits the return
of the exiled Cubans, it is not very likely that many
of them would return, especially if the communist
system persists. Some of them would maybe opt for
returning and investing in Cuba, if the private initia-
tive is permitted, but then the question of return of
the confiscated property would arise, and could pro-
voke social and financial problems. If the succes-
sion government wants to introduce reforms related
with the rule of law, it will face problems which are
a common behavior today (corruption, black mar-
ket, violations of laws in order to survive, etc). A
change in the mentality of people would be neces-
sary, and this is not an easy, nor a quick task.
The significant issue of the human rights, re-
pression and totalitarian control over the society will
also be very important, and it could be expected that
the succession government will conduct a low pro-
file "softened" repressive policy, except in case of
heavy social disorders or anarchy. It is hard to imag-
ine, however, that a communist-style succession gov-
ernment would permit the legalization of a multi-
party system and free elections, since that would
weaken their political control or even remove them
from power.
It is likely that the succession communist gov-
ernment would try to improve the relations with the
US, in order to attract the inflow of American tour-
ists and investments, as well as to promote normal
commercial relations. If the US continues with the
full implementation of the existing policy of embargo
or even tightens it, then the reforms of the succes-
sion government could not be as successful as in the
case of the mutual overture. In that case also the
policy of repression against internal opposition would
continue. If the embargo is loosened, some degree
of American investments is possible, together with
liberalization of trade and the significant inflow of
American tourists, and that would improve Cuban
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balance of payments. The visits of the exiled Cu-
bans and their remittances would increase. Of course,
such an overture may bring problems: increased
emigration of Cubans to the US and disputes over
the claims for the return of the confiscated property
of the American citizens and of the exiled Cubans.
It is difficult to predict massive popular mo-
bilization in Cuba during the succession, like the
events that brought down the communist regimes in
East Europe, or even a revolution similar to that in
Rumania that toppled Ceaucescu, but it is not im-
possible scenario either. Such developments are pos-
sible if the internal opposition will have enough
strength to mobilize the masses (with some more or
less subtle assistance from abroad), or if the new
govemment increases repression and introduces poli-
cies that would worsen the economic and social situ-
ation. In such case, after a short-lived succession
government, there would be a transitional govern-
ment composed of the representatives of the internal
opposition and, possibly, of the political parties of
the exiled Cubans (it is unlikely but not impossible
that some moderate politicians from the existing rul-
ing elite be included in such government). The le-
galization of political parties, elections and consti-
tutional changes would follow. New democratic gov-
ernment would certainly introduce substantial
changes and reforms (change of the political and
economic systems, privatizations, foreign private
investments, etc). Such reforms would be welcomed
by the population, but if the social consequences are
costly, the reactions could turn negative.
In such scenario, the relations with the US
would be immediately improved, the embargo re-
voked, the trade and tourism liberalized, and the in-
vestments would flow into the country. But, even in
such case, the government should have to take into
account the possibility that the people, living for
decades in an environment of a communist society,
would be afraid of quick and drastic changes towards
market economy, especially if the important social
benefits they enjoy now, although very limited be-
cause of the shortages, would be abolished (free edu-
cation and health care, social insurance, guaranteed
employment). Also, the people would oppose losing
their property because it should be returned to the
previous owners (American companies and citizens,
or exiled Cubans). The problems related to deep and
quick reforms, implemented by a transition govern-
ment, would be very much the same or most prob-
ably even worse than those in the case of a succes-
sion government.
The transition government, especially if the
representatives of the exile community participate
in it, should take care that there is no revenge or even
violence (neither by the government agencies them-
selves nor by the emigrants that will have return cd
to Cuba) against common Cubans just because they
previously have worked in the enterprises and insti-
tutions of the former regime.
It is certain, therefore, that the course of events
in Cuba in all scenarios very much depends on the
US policy. Washington is expected to avoid any no-
tion of direct involvement or intervention in the in-
ternal issues pertaining to the Cubans (although some
measures envisaged in the report prepared by the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba indicate
that such things might happen). In the case that there
is no transitional government, but only the succes-
sor one, a direct American military intervention is
not probable, except in case of serious internal crisis
in Cuba. The eventual intervention would not be sup-
ported internationally, and many Cubans would not
accept it either. It is certain that the centre-left gov-
ernments in Latin America would strongly oppose
any form of foreign direct intervention in the Cuban
internal affairs, but they would likewise oppose any
form of totalitarian policy of the succession Cuban
government.
5. Conclusion
The Cuban revolutionary experiment has sur-
vived the collapse of communism in Europe. but the
ruling class has had no courage to undertake signifi-
cant political and economic reforms to adapt the sys-
tem to the changed international environment. In the
last fifteen years Cuba's economy has been in de-
cline and social tensions have been rising. The in-
ternal political opposition grew significantly. Al-
though the opposition still does not represent a seri-
ous threat to President Fidel Castro, he has demon-
strated that he is ready to persecute the political op-
ponents even if this would bring about the worsen-
ing of Cuba's international position. The United
States have tightened the embargo and started directly
helping the internal opposition. With the eventual
physical departure of President Fidel Castro Cuba
will enter into a process of succession of power,
which will probably start within the existing politi-
cal system (General Raul Castro has been designated
as the successor), but with inevitable economic rc-
forms, most likely similar to those in China and Vi-
etnam. When a democratic political transition will
take place, it is impossible to predict.
During the period of the succession/transition,
the international factor will be very important. It
seems, however, that there is no common approach
among the key players to the situation in Cuba be-
fore and after the succession.
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The United States will favor only the rapid
political transition in Cuba after Castro towards
multi-party democracy and free market economy,
without a period of the communist succession gov-
ernment. They maintain and tighten the embargo
believing that a reactivation of the Cuban economy
under a totalitarian regime would reinforce such a
regime, while the embargo and newly introduced
measures should, according to the US strategy, has-
ten the collapse of the regime and enable the politi-
cal transition. It is only after the democratic changes
that the US would support and promote the economic
reforms in Cuba. However, it is likely that US would
not do anything which would provoke anarchy or
civil war in Cuba, since this would complicate the
situation (a wave of tens of thousands of emigrants
would pour into the US, a military intervention would
be almost inevitable).
The policy of the European Union, Canada and
the majority of the Latin American governments to-
wards Cuba has been based on the assumption that
economic changes and an end of Cuba's isolation
(including the abolition of the American embargo)
will lead to an overall opening of Cuba, to the im-
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proved human rights record, to developing of civil
society and, as a consequence, they would promote
the democratic development and subsequent politi-
cal transition. During the delicate moments of the
succession in Cuba, the EU, Canada and the govern-
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an important stabilizing role. From one side, they
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ternational support to the Cuban democratic opposi-
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model of the democratization of Cuba is entirely left
to the Cuban people and its political organizations.
Finally, they should encourage the present strategy






12 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. Report Home
Page. Introduction. hltp://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commis-
sion/2004/32244.htm. p. 1
13 Commission ...• p. 1
14 Commission ...• p. 2
15 Marifeli Perez-Stable. "Cuba: el dia despues del velorio"(ARI).
Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid. 21/1/2005. p. 4
16 "Meeting of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba".
Department of State. Washington D.C .• 2005. p.1
17 "Meeting ... ", p.2
18 James C. Cason. "Fostering Democracy in Cuba: Lessons
Learned". September 12. 2005. Cuba Transition Project. Insti-
tute for Cuban & American Studies. University of Miami. p.6
19 "EU Relations with Cuba". hltp.//europa.eu.intlcomm/devel-
opmentlbody/country. p. 2-3
20 William Ratcliff. "Cuba: After Fidel". Hoover Digest. 2004.
No.4. Hoover Institution. p. 2
21 E. Gonzalez & K. McCarthy. p. xi
22 Daniel P. Erikson. "Who's on First: Struggle for Succession
in Fidel Castro's Cuba". Cuba in Transition: Volume 14. p. 200
23 Ch.Agarwal. p. 324
----.----L
